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Procedures, regulations, and safety management systems (SMS) have reduced the 
incidence of occupational accidents, but they still occur. Current methods have 
enjoyed some success however these methods mostly address aspects of safety that 
are not behaviour-related. Researchers have argued that construction actors’ 
behaviours account for most accidents and so understanding and being able to modify 
behaviour should be crucial to improving the occupational safety and health (OSH) 
performance of the industry. In reference to behaviour, antecedents precede 
behaviours whilst consequences succeed behaviours and researchers argue that both 
direct construction actors’ behaviour. It is therefore important to study and use them 
strategically to increase and decrease the frequency of safe and unsafe behaviours 
respectively. Some antecedents (e.g. training and ergonomics) and some 
consequences (e.g. saving time and convenience) of construction actors’ safety 
behaviours are discussed. Further, modification techniques (e.g. classical and operant 
conditioning) that can improve these behaviours are also examined. Researchers have 
also argued that safety culture and safety climate influence construction actor’s safety 
behaviours and the relationship between the two are discussed as well. According to 
the theory of planned behaviour and the theory of reasoned action, there seems to a 
misalignment between perceived and actual behaviours; this paves way for further 
research. This paper summarises the findings of a literature review on behavioural 
safety and discusses several techniques to modify behaviours and potential areas for 
further research. 
Keywords: behaviour modification, climate, culture, safety behaviour, safety 
performance. 
INTRODUCTION 
Ample opportunities exist to improve safety performance in the construction industry.  
Over the last five years, the construction industry has been responsible for an average 
of 53 fatal injuries to workers (Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 2013), with an 
increase being recorded last year (2013/14) in comparison with the previous year 
(2012/13) from 39 to 42. Although the current rate of accidents in construction shows 
a marginal reduction compared to the rate in previous years, the problem of 
unacceptable occupational safety and health (OSH) performance persists and appears 
to be plateauing and not reducing fast enough. It is clear that OSH management needs 
to be more effective. Perhaps a different way to look at safety, to reduce accidents 
further in the construction industry, is required. 
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This paper therefore discusses methods to further reduce accidents that cause harm 
and incidents that do not cause harm and also sustain and improve this reduction so 
that the chances of relapse are reduced. Pybus (1996) developed a model that 
categorises safety management into three phases: traditional phase, transitional phase 
and innovative phase; this model is adapted for this paper. Causes of accidents are 
placed into three broad classes – systems, people and force majeure. ‘Systems’ 
broadly cover the aspects of safety that deal with rules, processes, procedures, 
regulations, technology and engineering, and this parallels the traditional and 
transitional phases of the Pybus model. ‘People’ broadly covers human behaviours, 
and this parallels the innovative phase of the Pybus model where safety and health is 
integrated into all the decisions that people make. Lastly, force majeure deals with 
occurrences beyond human control such as adverse weather conditions. This paper 
focuses on the ‘people’ aspect of OSH management and makes links with the systems 
aspect as their interaction is inevitable; one does not work properly without the other 
(Anderson 2005; Hopkins 2006; Reason 2009; HSE 2009). Also, the safety aspect of 
OSH management is given more attention than the health aspect. 
The current UK safety legislation proposes minimum standards that organisations 
must adhere to but perhaps ought to tackle safety behaviour specifically. In complex 
problem solving where people and systems interact, there is no one size fits all 
approach (DeJoy 2005). Sherratt (2014) argues that the problem with the construction 
industry lies with the people that operate within it. Accordingly, it appears that some 
of the current systems can be revised to take account of factors that affect safety 
behaviour. The argument for behaviour-based safety (BBS) is too important to be 
ignored or taken with a pinch of salt (see Sulzer-Azaroff and Austin 2000). 
Behaviour-based safety (BBS) has been instrumental in reducing accidents and 
increasing the overall safety performance in several industries (Sulzer-Azaroff and 
Austin 2000; Geller 2011) and it can also have a positive impact on productivity 
(Geller 2011). Cooper (2010) argues that the benefits of BBS outweigh its costs, 
which would suggest that there should be no reason why all UK construction 
companies do not employ this strategy of reducing accidents. 
At this juncture, clarification will be made between people-based safety (PBS) and 
behaviour-based safety (BBS). Geller (2011) states that PBS emanates from BBS and 
includes “cognition, perception and person states”. In this paper, BBS and PBS are 
considered to be the same as behaviours are viewed with the theoretical lens that 
considers internal and external influences, which PBS purports to incorporate. 
SAFETY BEHAVIOUR 
Behaviour, and by extension, safety behaviour, is influenced by activators/antecedents 
and consequences (Miltenberger 2012). Figure 1 presents the ABC model of 
behaviour, which shows relationship between activators (referred to as antecedents in 
the rest of the paper), behaviours and consequences; antecedents precede and direct 
behaviour while consequences result from the behaviour and can motivate the 
behaviour (Geller 2011).  
Antecedents and consequences have varying impacts on safety behaviour and some 
authors (e.g. Jankiewicz and Horne 2000) argue that consequences are stronger 
influencers of behaviour than antecedents. Reliance on antecedents is traditionally the 
norm however; it may be more beneficial to pay closer attention to consequences 
more often because positive consequences drive the reoccurrence of behaviours 
Safety behaviour modification 
 
(Geller 2011). Jankiewicz and Horne (2000) discuss three factors that determine the 
strength of consequences – its positivity or negativity, the time that lapses before it 
occurs (after the behaviour) and the certainty or uncertainty of its occurrence. They 
claim that consequences which are more positive, sure to occur and manifest quicker 
yield the best results; this is in contrast with the blame culture that Baiden et al. (2006) 
claim that the construction industry traditionally has. Bolt et al. (2012) argue that 
experience from the London 2012 Olympic Park construction showed that a culture of 
trust was needed to change from the blame culture prevalent in the industry. 
 
 
Figure 1: ABC of Behaviour 
To change behaviour, barriers like poor communication, which hinder construction 
actors from engaging with safe behaviours, have to be weakened and overcome 
(Garlapati et al. 2013). Garlapati et al. (2013) argue that natural consequences such as 
‘saving time’ and ‘convenience’ reinforce unsafe behaviours and are often too strong; 
therefore they have to be altered and re-directed to favour safe behaviours. For 
example, one of the consequences of successfully using an unsecure ladder is likely to 
be the time saved. On the other hand, a different consequence may be an accident. To 
an experienced operative who has done this for many years, complacency becomes a 
valid factor that can creep in (HSE 2009). In contrast, Fernández-Muñiz et al. (2012) 
argue, based on their study of 606 OHSAS (Occupational Health and Safety 
Assessment Series) 18001-certified organisations, that work pressures do not affect 
safety behaviours in OHSAS 18001-certified organisations as the work pressures in 
such organisations are ostensibly lower and their managers are more devoted to and 
prioritise safety. 
Additionally, Peltzer and Renner (2003) argue that overconfidence correlates 
positively with at-risk or risky behaviours. This overconfident characteristic comes 
from carrying out an activity repeatedly therefore becoming experienced at it (HSE, 
2009). HSE (2009) explain that overconfidence can reduce an individual’s perception 
of a risk, which is critical to reducing the amount of incidents or accidents that occur 
because people who assess and view activities as ‘low risk’ tasks tend to have greater 
rates of accidents. According to HSE (2009), it is common for people to view the risks 
involved with their jobs as lower than that of others and therefore frequently assess the 
risk wrongly thereby underestimating it; an approach to improve risk perception is by 
education (HSE 2009).  
Antecedents like training and ergonomics (McDermott et al. 2007) play a huge part in 
materialising more frequent safe behaviours; training equips people with the right 
skills to successfully execute their tasks and ergonomics (e.g. correct height of a 
worktop) makes people feel more comfortable carrying out their tasks. Leading 
indicators (e.g. training) proactively deal with safety management as opposed to 
lagging indicators (e.g. lost time injuries), which are reactive. Leading indicators are 
as valuable as, and arguably more valuable than lagging indicators of safety 
(Zwetsloot et al. 2014). Waiting for a dangerous occurrence is a reactive way of 
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dealing with occupational safety and as such, unsafe behaviours need to be changed 
prior to the manifestation of such occurrences.  
Zin and Ismail (2012) highlight the need to enforce antecedents sometimes, which can 
aid compliance and ultimately reduce incidents and accidents. Some authors (e.g. 
Jankiewicz and Horne 2000; Daniels 2000; Geller 2005) argue that getting employees 
to want to engage in safe behaviours is better and more valuable than forcing 
employees to comply. For this change from compliance to self-ownership to occur, 
Geller (2005) claims that people have to be more responsible and Jankiewicz and 
Horne (2000) claim that their needs have to be met. 
Zin and Ismail (2012) further explain that factors such as safety leadership, 
management commitment and good communication can help to achieve higher 
compliance rates. Fernando et al. (2008) adds that employee involvement and 
effective safety feedback improves safety compliance as well. Further, skills, 
specifically non-technical skills (NTS), which can be considered to be antecedents, 
have been found to reduce accidents (Reader and O’Connor 2013).  These skills deal 
with individuals’ cognitive and social abilities that support safe performance in high-
risk environments (Flin et al. 2008). 
Situational awareness, which can be said to be an NTS, has also been linked heavily 
with abating accidents (Stanton et al. 2001). This concept is still increasing in 
popularity (Patrick and Morgan 2010) and is defined by the HSE (2012) as “being 
aware of what is happening around you in terms of where you are, where you are 
supposed to be, and whether anyone or anything around you is a threat to your health 
and safety”. In short, it is ‘knowing what you are doing, what you should be doing, 
what should be happening as you are doing it and what should eventually happen 
when it is done’. 
Resilience, another antecedent, is considered to be the ability to successfully adapt to 
a change in circumstances. Resilient organisations have the ability to predict, monitor, 
learn and react to challenges (Praetorius et al. 2012). Further, Hollnagel (2008) argues 
that managers should regard people and their dynamic ability as assets rather than 
liabilities. Perhaps, being resilient tackles the latent condition pathways to accidents 
that Reason (2009) refers to in his accident causation model to an extent, in that, if an 
organisation is resilient, it should be better equipped to predict and mitigate unplanned 
developments. 
Safety capability, which Griffin et al. (2014) define as the “capability to maintain the 
safety of complex systems operating in uncertain and interdependent environments”, 
is also important in preventing accidents. In order to achieve this capability, 
employees need to understand the intricacies of work processes rather than follow 
rules or instructions blindly (Woods and Hollnagel 2006). 
The next section explores various behaviour modification techniques that researchers 
have suggested can be used to alter behaviours. 
BEHAVIOUR MODIFICATION 
The psychologist Bandura (1977) claims that behaviours are learned and McAfee and 
Winn (1989) explain that improvements in safety behaviour and performance have 
occurred through the use of psychologically based methods known as “Applied 
Behaviour Analysis” (APA), which involves using various behaviour modification 
techniques (BMTs) to change behaviour. 
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Locke (1974) argues that when a baby is born, his/her mind is totally blank, a state 
commonly known as tabula rasa, and the baby’s mind begins to acquire knowledge 
from experiences and or learning. To this end, Bandura (1977) argues that it follows 
that if human beings are exposed to unsafe behaviours, they are likely to emulate 
them; this is commonly known as the social learning theory. On the contrary, some 
researchers have argued that Locke’s tabula rasa is flawed (Duschinsky 2012). 
Classical conditioning 
The psychologist Thorndike (1898) introduced the ‘Law of effect’ theory. This theory 
explains that any behaviour that is accompanied by pleasant consequences will 
probably be repeated and any behaviour that is accompanied by negative 
consequences will probably reduce or stop. For example, if an untrained person 
operates a dumper without having an accident or any negative repercussion and 
perhaps saves time (pleasant consequence), this person is likely to operate the 
machine again without training in future. 
Pavlov (1902) developed classical conditioning and it involves the association of a 
neutral stimulus (NS) to an unconditioned response (UR); this technique has been and 
is still being successfully applied to modify behaviours. Table 1 shows the four key 
terms associated with this BMT namely, unconditioned stimulus (US), unconditioned 
response (UR), conditioned stimulus (CS) and conditioned response (CR) and are 
explained.  
Pavlov (1902) shows that this technique applied to animals and Watson and Rayner 
(2000) later show that it can be applied to humans as well when they conducted the 
‘Little Albert’ experiment. 
Operant conditioning 
Skinner (1938) agrees that human beings do indeed have minds, however he believed 
that it is more practical and valuable to study their behaviours rather than their internal 
minds because this is more tangible and observable. Skinner believed that the 
principal way to study behaviour is by observing the causes of an action and its 
consequences. This, he called “Operant Conditioning”. Accordingly, he alleges that 
the study of behaviours is scientific and not abstract and believes that behaviours are 
affected by consequences and can therefore be derived. Hollnagel (2008) alludes to 
the importance of learning from successes and failures (consequences) in order to 
increase good behaviours and reduce bad behaviours. Table 1 shows 3 elements 
(reinforcement, punishment and extinction) that have varying effects on behaviour 
under this conditioning technique. Reinforcement and punishment can be positive and 
negative however, in any case, reinforcement aims to increase the frequency of 
behaviour and punishment aims to decrease the frequency of behaviour. 
Garlapati et al. (2013) argue that positive reinforcement, such as praise, is more 
effective in the long term than rewards. They further explain that incentives like 
money may be good, however, satisfaction from feeling highly regarded is more likely 
to lead to positive behaviours that are long lasting and natural. Positive reinforcement 
encourages people to go over and beyond their job duties as well as take reasonable 
care of their safety and the safety of others. Positive reinforcement ensures people are 
working towards good ideals as opposed to trying to avoid negative repercussions. 
Skinner (1972) advises that extra caution must be taken when using punishment 
because this technique can be construed to limit freedom and choice and can therefore 
backfire and propel people to carry out more unsafe behaviours or in worse scenarios 
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lead to theft and vandalism. Extinction burst, which is the initial increase in frequency, 
duration and intensity, may occur when previously reinforced behaviours are being 
extinguished (Miltenberger 2012). 
Table 1: Classical and Operant Conditioning 
Classical Conditioning 
US – Stimulus that 
automatically provokes 
a response. For 
example, arrival of a 
boss. 
UR – Response that 
is triggered 
automatically when 
the US is present. 
For example, 
carpenter begins to 
work. 
CS – Initially neutral 
stimulus (NS), which 
later triggers a response 
when paired with the 
US. For example, 
buzzer that sounds 
when the boss arrives. 
CR – Response that is 
triggered by association 
with the CR over time. 
For example, carpenter 
begins to work when 
the buzzer is heard, 
even without seeing the 
boss. 
Operant Conditioning 
Reinforcement – Increases the 
frequency of behaviour; it can 
be positive or negative. In 
other words, positive 
reinforcement (addition) and 
negative reinforcement 
(removal). For example, 
increasing a workers bonus 
after he/she engages in safe 
behaviours can increase the 
frequency of the safe 
behaviour. 
Punishment – Decreases the 
frequency of behaviour; it can 
be positive of negative. In 
other words, positive 
punishment (addition) and 
negative punishment 
(removal). For example, 
reducing a workers bonus after 
he/she engages in unsafe 
behaviours can reduce the 
frequency of the safe 
behaviour. 
Extinction – Decreases the 
frequency of a previously 
reinforced behaviour. For 
example, if working without 
steel-toe cap boots on site was 
previously reinforced, 
enforcing a strict compulsory 
steel-toe cap boots policy is 
likely to reduce the behaviour 
of wearing regular boots 
without steel-toe caps. 
 
Social conditioning 
Social conditioning is a BMT that relates to the sociological influences that urge 
people to behave in certain ways. Two main theories that support this are ‘The Theory 
of Reasoned Action’ (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) and ‘The Theory of Planned 
Behaviour’ (Ajzen 1991). The latter, which is more recent and somewhat supersedes 
the former, purports that behaviour is influenced by intention, which is influenced by 
attitudes, social norms and perceived behavioural controls; it is also argued that 
perceived behavioural control can have direct impact on behaviour.  
Dijksterhuis and Bargh (2001) explain that the “perception – behaviour” connection 
leads to a default proclivity to act in the same way as those around. For example, a 
bricklayer who is used to stacking bricks on scaffolding without a brickguard gets a 
new job with another organisation and soon realises that every other bricklayer in the 
new establishment uses a brickguard. The bricklayer is likely to adapt and start using 
brickguards. This form of conditioning is aided by peer pressure and positive safety 
culture. HSE (2009) argue that the things people see around them are major influences 
of behaviour. Other social influences such as leadership style and culture are believed 
to change thoughts, beliefs and values, and many researchers constantly have the 
nature vs. nurture debate, in the belief that either one or sometimes both define how 
human beings develop (Duschinsky 2012). Another type of reinforcement, known as 
vicarious reinforcement, is worthy of mention under this category (Miltenberger 
2012); this reinforcement type is less direct. For example, if the bricklayer realises 
that people who do not use brickguards get fired, he/she is likely start using a 
brickguard provided that the job is important. 
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Thus far, the internal aspects of a human being have not being considered. It is 
possible that the carpenter in Table 1 does not begin to work when the boss arrives 
because he/she is not happy with the work conditions. This leads to the cognitive 
aspect of behaviour. In contrast to Thorndike and Skinner who focus on external 
factors, Neisser (1967) argues that human behaviour is affected by both external 
factors like reinforcement and internal factors like beliefs and feelings. Figure 2 shows 
external (outside circle) and internal (inside circle) arrows, which indicate external 
and internal influences respectively on human behaviour, which is represented by the 
circle.  
 
Figure 2: Internal and external influences on human behaviour 
From Figure 2, it is logical for senior management to aim to move all their employees 
to the bottom-right quadrant, where the external and internal influences encourage 
safe behaviours. Safety climate and safety culture are two key external factors, 
amongst others like work pressures, work resources and education, which influence 
behaviours. 
SAFETY CLIMATE AND SAFETY CULTURE 
In recent times, one of the debates about safety has been related to climate and culture; 
safety climate vs. safety culture, both of which influence safety behaviour (HSE 
2009). 
Safety climate 
Safety climate has been linked to psychological attributes of employees (i.e. the way 
people feel, their values, attitudes and perceptions) with regards to safety within an 
organisation (Human Engineering, 2005). In a sense, it is the way employees 
appreciate safety in the workplace. It is common for organisations to boast a good 
safety climate at the corporate level, however if their employees feel that safety is not 
treated with utmost regard, the organisation’s safety climate is considered to be poor 
(Cooper and Phillips 2004). Signs of poor safety climate are high staff turnover rates, 
high absenteeism or sickness rates, high direct human-related accidents, low levels of 
obedience to safety rules and high levels of protests from staff about working 
conditions (HSE 2009). 
Geller (2011) argues that BBS imbibes a reporting climate into an organisation and 
this can lead to reduced incidents and accidents. It is only logical that reducing the 
number of incidents will leads to a reduction in the number of accidents, hence it is 
imperative to instil a ‘reporting’ climate to encourage employees to report any issues 
or incidents that occur so that learning can transpire. 
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Safety culture 
Safety culture has become a common tool used to ameliorate safety performance 
(Finneran and Gibb 2013) and a core part of behaviour-based safety is the culture in 
which it is bred. The Advisory Committee for Safety in Nuclear Installations (ACSNI) 
Human Factors Study Group (1993) provide the following definition for the phrase, 
perhaps the most widely accepted: “The safety culture of an organisation is the 
product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and 
patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency 
of an organisation’s health and safety management”. They go further to state that 
“organisations with a positive safety culture are characterised by communications 
founded on mutual trust, shared perceptions of the importance of safety and 
confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures.” 
Cooper (2002) explains that safety culture is a subcomponent of corporate culture that 
relates to the job, organisation and individual (JOI) elements that affect and influence 
safety. According to Reason (2009), culture determines the efficiency and 
effectiveness of safety management systems (SMS). Positive safety behaviour will 
only thrive in an organisation where the culture permits hence, organisational culture, 
more specifically, safety culture has to be properly considered and investigated to 
ensure it is appropriate for positive safe behaviours to grow and be sustained. Good 
safety culture can therefore help to reduce accidents, ensure that adequate attention is 
given to safety and increase commitment to safety (Cooper 2002). 
According to Reason (2009), culture can be socially engineered and it takes deliberate 
efforts to achieve good culture; senior management is responsible for ensuring that a 
good safety culture is ingrained within the organisation (Fernández-Muñiz et al. 2012; 
National Oil Spill Commission 2011; Hopkins 2006). A safe culture must be an 
informed one (Reason 2009) and Borys et al. (2009) apprise that an informed culture 
is made up of four interrelated subcultures: reporting culture, learning culture, just 
culture and flexible culture. Some critical factors required to achieve a safer culture 
are trust, accountability and information (Hudson 2007). 
LINK BETWEEN SAFETY CLIMATE AND SAFETY CULTURE 
Figure 3 shows the distinction and link between safety climate and safety culture. 
 
Figure 3: Relationship between safety climate and safety culture 
From Figure 3, safety culture is decided at the corporate level by senior management 
whilst the ‘heads’ of the individual constituting departments decide the safety climate 
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for their departments. For example, a construction company may have 6 sites as in 
Figure 3. The company’s senior management will generally influence the safety 
culture and it should be fairly constant at any point in time, whilst the sites will have 
different safety climates, which will depend on various factors, such as safety 
management systems, technology and people. These people such as clients, project 
managers and employees are the construction actors affiliated with the site. 
To achieve excellent safety performance on a site, the safety climate, which underpins 
the site’s core functioning ability and the safety culture from the corporate level, have 
to be at the maximum. The culture is the underpinning factor, which sets the potential 
for climate; good culture should lead to good climate, ceteris paribus, and vice versa. 
Safety culture is the true value and intention of the organisation towards safety, whilst 
safety climate can be explained to be the perceived values of an organisation towards 
safety; ‘perceived’ is not always the same as ‘true’ (Sherratt 2014). 
Sustaining safety behaviour 
Trying to change behaviours can prove challenging especially when the safe 
behaviour to be engaged in is not known. Geller (2005) places behaviour into three 
classes: behaviours that are directed by others, behaviours that are directed by one’s 
self and behaviours that are not directed consciously but based on reflex. In theory, 
people have to be taught and educated on the correct safe behaviour to engage in and 
with repetition (Stanley 2010), the new behaviour should move from being directed by 
others through to self-directed and eventually automatic. Once the behaviour is 
automatic, it is likely to be sustained. Geller (2011) argues that it is sometimes good 
for behaviours to occur out of habit, however it is better to engage in most safety 
related behaviours after some form of cognitive reasoning because situations vary and 
therefore solutions may have to be adapted. Garlapati et al. (2013) highlight the effect 
that climate has on performance stating that good climate is the medium that allows 
for the best performance. 
DISCUSSION 
This paper is the first stage in a study that explores the relationship between what 
people in the construction industry perceive and what they actually do. It is envisaged 
that the understanding of this perception versus actual behaviour relationship will shed 
more light on the barriers that prevent people from engaging in safe behaviours. 
It appears that a ‘one fits all’ approach to safety will not work as people vary vastly 
based on factors such as their beliefs, experience, knowledge and perception of risk. 
To this end, it is critical to explore reasons why people do what they know is wrong. 
The second stage of this research investigates the perceived and actual value systems 
of construction actors as well as examines the barriers that prevent the alignment of 
safety culture and safety climate. Crucial to this study is the understanding of ‘The 
Theory of Reasoned Action’ and ‘The Theory of Planned Behaviour’, which can shed 
some light on the attitude-behaviour relationship. The next phase of this study will 
involve observing construction actors in their natural work environments; interviews 
will then follow to understand the reasoning behind their actions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It appears that if the ‘people’ problem is solved, many, if not most occupational 
accidents can be eliminated. Behaviour modification techniques ought to be more 
frequently employed to nudge people to engage in safe behaviours. A key to ensuring 
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more frequent safe behaviours lies within the safety culture and safety climate of an 
organisation. It is known that the safety culture and the safety climate are not always 
in alignment and resolving this disparity may be the solution to achieving better safety 
performance. Once the barriers that prevent this gap from being closed are realised 
and resolved, the ‘people’ issue becomes yet smaller therefore fewer accidents will 
occur because more people will engage more frequently in safer behaviours. 
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